Defence, Drones, Diplomacy: Ukraine and the GCC

Ukraine’s most recent defence cooperation agreements with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Middle Eastern states point to a subtle but possibly important shift in global security dynamics. Drawing on its meanwhile four-year-old conflict with Russia, Kyiv’s recent diplomatic efforts have added an unexpected European dimension to the current crisis in the Gulf region, perhaps reshaping local responses to Iranian missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

Relying on layered air defence systems such as THAAD and Patriot, along with fighter jets, the Gulf states have coped very well with the targeting of assets and infrastructure on their territories. Some may still have looked to Ukraine to replenish stocks in the most economical fashion.

And for good reason, according to Sabena Siddiqui. As its conflict has progressed, Ukraine has become adept at producing cheap but effective drones to counter UAVs. These include the Sting, a loitering munitions quadcopter with a 95% success rate and major contributor to the downing of almost 4000 drones.

Ukraine’s sudden relevance to the GCC security landscape potentially draws the group closer to the wider European security ecosystem, where experience from the Russia–Ukraine conflict complements US-backed systems and signals a further broadening of Gulf defence partnerships beyond traditional allies.

On the surface, closer security ties between Ukraine and the GCC are a response to similar defence needs. Ukraine offers extensive and hard-earned knowledge in countering missiles and drones. For the GCC, access to cost- and operationally-effective capabilities lessens reliance on high-end Western platforms.

This may not be particularly good news for those manufacturers that have supplied the GCC with military hardware for decades.

“As access to advanced systems becomes more constrained and operational requirements potentially evolve in other parts of the world, GCC states are likely to integrate a wider mix of suppliers and solutions,” says Adam Dempsey.

“For leading Western defence contractors, the implication is clear: longstanding assumptions about market positions may no longer hold. Competitive advantage may increasingly depend not just on technological sophistication, but on responsiveness, cost, and alignment with shifting regional priorities.”

Khristo Ayad revisits President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent tour across the Gulf states: In light of its ongoing conflict with Russia, Ukraine will indeed know better than most how to effectively and more economically respond to the challenges posed by large numbers of inexpensive drones. Ukrainian experience may therefore be a relevant and interesting source of insight for the Gulf states that today are facing similar concerns, even if they have proven to be very well prepared, leaning on long-standing traditional defence ties.

Zelenskyy’s presence in the Gulf, however, was also an opportunity to further position his country within the Western transatlantic alliance’s context and to uphold global visibility at a time when the world’s focus has increasingly turned to the Middle East. Both his domestic and international audiences have surely taken note of the meetings in Gulf capitals, where he was able to appear as a leader that has something to offer, rather than something to ask for. Elsewhere this has been called a masterclass in wartime diplomacy, but there likely also was a significant element of PR thinking to it.

As per Prof. Dr. Frank Himpel, defence cooperation between Kyiv and the GCC does hold potential given Ukraine’s real-world field experience. However, defence technologies evolve rapidly, particularly drone systems, where capabilities can shift within months. What proved effective in one season may be obsolete in the next, creating specific complexity for GCC decision-makers.

Managing such a fast pace requires continuous innovation across drone capabilities. Ukrainian know-how offers value, but remains shaped by its specific operational context, namely the iterative adaptation in response to adversary system advancements. While exportable, its relevance is not necessarily universal or long-term.

The challenge deepens if other players enter the field. China, for instance, is advancing its proprietary AI-driven technologies across civilian sectors and is likely to translate these into next-generation military applications. Ukraine may not yet have faced such AI-integrated systems at scale.

GCC policymakers could therefore prefer to pursue an integrated defence concept that incorporates Ukrainian experience without relying on it exclusively. It might prove beneficial in the longer term to expand on cooperation with other partners that merely are not defence partners, yet.