Defence, Drones, Diplomacy: Ukraine and the GCC
Ukraine’s most recent defence cooperation agreements with Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and other Middle Eastern states point to a subtle but possibly important shift in global security dynamics. Drawing on its meanwhile four-year-old conflict with Russia, Kyiv’s recent diplomatic efforts have added an unexpected European dimension to the current crisis in the Gulf region, perhaps reshaping local responses to Iranian missile and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attacks.
Relying on layered air defense systems such as THAAD and Patriot, along with fighter jets, the Gulf states have coped very well with the targeting of assets and infrastructure on their territories. But with supplies of expensive and finite interceptors potentially running low in the future, some may have looked to Ukraine to replenish stocks.
And for good reason, according to Sabena Siddiqui. As its conflict has progressed, Ukraine has become adept at producing cheap but effective drones to counter Russia’s Iranian-produced Shahed UAVs. These include the Sting, a loitering munitions quadcopter with a 95% success rate and major contributor to the downing of almost 4000 drones.
Ukraine’s sudden relevance to the GCC security landscape potentially draws the group closer to the wider European security ecosystem, where experience from the Russia–Ukraine war complements US-backed systems and signals a gradual broadening of Gulf defence partnerships beyond traditional allies.
On the surface, closer security ties between Ukraine and the GCC are a response to shared threats. Ukraine offers extensive and hard-earned knowledge in countering missile and drone attacks, many of which mirror systems currently targeting Gulf states. For the GCC, access to cost- and operationally-effective capabilities lessens reliance on high-end Western platforms.
This is not particularly good news for those manufacturers that have supplied the GCC with military hardware for decades.
“As access to advanced systems becomes more constrained and operational requirements potentially evolve in other parts of the world, GCC states are likely to integrate a wider mix of suppliers and solutions,” says Adam Dempsey.
“For leading Western defence contractors, the implication is clear: longstanding assumptions about market positions may no longer hold. Competitive advantage will increasingly depend not just on technological sophistication, but on responsiveness, cost, and alignment with shifting regional priorities.”
Khristo Ayad revisits President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s recent tour across the Gulf states: In light of their ongoing conflict with Russia, Ukraine will indeed know better than most how to effectively and more economically respond to the challenges posed by large numbers of inexpensive attack drones. Ukrainian experience may therefore be a relevant and interesting source of insight for the Gulf states that today are facing a similar threat, even if they have proven to be far better prepared, leaning on long-standing defense ties with the U.S. and Europe.
Zelenskyy’s presence in the Gulf region, however, was also an opportunity to further position his country within the Western transatlantic alliance’s context and to uphold global visibility at a time when the world’s focus has increasingly turned to Iran and the Middle East. Both his domestic and international audiences have surely taken note of the meetings in Gulf capitals, where he was able to appear as a leader that has something to offer, rather than something to ask for. Elsewhere this has been called a masterclass in wartime diplomacy, but there likely also was a significant element of PR thinking to it.